Philosophy Conference

Somewhat surprisingly, I had a pretty good time at the American Philosophical Association Western Division Conference these past two days in Pasadena. My presentation as part of a panel discussion on doing philosophy with kids was very well-received; I attended a number of talks that I found thoughtful and thought-provoking; I saw a handful of people I know and like; and best of all, I think, I was reminded how much I like talking about and hearing other people talk about ideas intelligently, reasonably, and often, using big words.

My favorite session was one yesterday entitled “Consent.” The main speaker, a guy named Arthur Ripstein, argued that in order for consent to be achieved, and offer has to be given and assented to, such that both parties achieve a meeting (or he may have said “union” of the wills. The commentator, a philosopher I’ve seen and been really impressed by before, Seana Schiffrin, responded that it seems like in lots of cases, consent can be given even if the person to whom consent is given hasn’t yet accepted, like if I consent to a medical procedure before evening knowing if the doctor would be available to perform it.

Both, however, agreed that the person giving consent has to make public the offer, which made me wonder how public that has to be. Suppose, for instance, I’m a shy teenage boy, and before going out on a date, I write in my journal (which unlike my blog, I never want anyone to ever read) that I hope the girl I’m with will kiss me. I don’t tell her this and because I’m so shy, I don’t give her any clues on the date that I would like her to plant a wet one on my lips.

Have I therefore, though, given her my consent to kiss me? My own intuition is that I have, but maybe that’s because, if not, I probably never ever would have been kissed.