Universal Human Rights
One of my former professors from the UW, William J. Talbott, came to Cascadia today to give a talk based on his recent book, Which Rights Should Be Universal? as the kick-off event for activities in support of “Human Rights Week,” a series of talks, films, and seminars in conjunction with International Human Rights Day and MLK Day.
While concerns could be raised that it smacks of tokenism to have just one day or even a week devoted to awareness of human rights, no such quibbles with Bill’s talk, which was a fine example of accessible philosophy deeply engaged with real-world issues.
Essentially, Talbott’s view is that human rights are “discovered” through a socio-historical process of empirical inquiry much as any facts about the world or human nature are discovered. He rejects the claim made, for instance, in the Declaration of Independence that certain rights such as life and liberty are “self-evident,” asking quite reasonably, that if they were, why did so many of our Founding Fathers keep slaves?
What’s especially refreshing about Bill’s view is that it is, as he puts it, “epistemologically modest but metaphysically immodest.” To wit, he’s immodest enough to claim that certain rights—for instance, to life, to an education, to freedom of religion and the press, to a sphere of personal autonomy free from paternalistic restrictions—should be universal, but he’s modest enough to say he—and we—could be wrong about any one or all of these.
Thus, he strikes a balance between moral imperialism and moral relativism, avoiding both absolutism and wishy-washyness.
His talk was well-attended and nearly everyone stuck around to ask questions. It was incredibly gratifying to see people excited by philosophical discussion and I was reminded me of what brought me to philosophy in the first place.
Plus, it was ego gratifying to be able to introduce my former teacher as a tenured faculty myself. Doing so, I felt neither epistemologically nor metaphysically modest at all.
While concerns could be raised that it smacks of tokenism to have just one day or even a week devoted to awareness of human rights, no such quibbles with Bill’s talk, which was a fine example of accessible philosophy deeply engaged with real-world issues.
Essentially, Talbott’s view is that human rights are “discovered” through a socio-historical process of empirical inquiry much as any facts about the world or human nature are discovered. He rejects the claim made, for instance, in the Declaration of Independence that certain rights such as life and liberty are “self-evident,” asking quite reasonably, that if they were, why did so many of our Founding Fathers keep slaves?
What’s especially refreshing about Bill’s view is that it is, as he puts it, “epistemologically modest but metaphysically immodest.” To wit, he’s immodest enough to claim that certain rights—for instance, to life, to an education, to freedom of religion and the press, to a sphere of personal autonomy free from paternalistic restrictions—should be universal, but he’s modest enough to say he—and we—could be wrong about any one or all of these.
Thus, he strikes a balance between moral imperialism and moral relativism, avoiding both absolutism and wishy-washyness.
His talk was well-attended and nearly everyone stuck around to ask questions. It was incredibly gratifying to see people excited by philosophical discussion and I was reminded me of what brought me to philosophy in the first place.
Plus, it was ego gratifying to be able to introduce my former teacher as a tenured faculty myself. Doing so, I felt neither epistemologically nor metaphysically modest at all.
posted by Professor Dave at 9:19 PM
0 Comments:
Post a Comment
<< Home