Who Am I?

In my Philosophical Questions class, we’re on to the topic of personal identity: basically, questions like “Who am I?” “What makes me me?” and “How can I be the same person I was when I was an infant (assuming I am) when so much of who I am is so different?”

The past few times I’ve taught this class, I’ve had students explore this topic early in the quarter. It tends to be an issue they’re naturally drawn to and it sets up a spirit of inquiry that has generally formed a pretty good foundation for examining other, more abstract topics on down the line.

Oddly, the “problem” of personal identity is not one that usually draws me in. While it’s interesting to wonder what this thing I recognize as “me” is, I’ve tended to have a hard time seeing how it really makes a difference. Whether I’m a soul, a body, a psychic substance, or just an illusion, whether I’m the same being I was at 6 months old, while that’s all reasonable fodder for discussion and barroom chatter, it doesn’t seem to make much of a difference when I’m out in the world, on my bike, or cheering the Steelers on to a much-needed win.

I like the thought experiments we usually play with in exploring this topic, though. All those switched-mind examples, where we get to wonder where Dave is when his mind is placed in another person’s body, those to me are fun to think about. And they usually lead to spirited in-class discussions.

Today a student gave a lovely analogy raising concerns over whether such examples are even theoretically possible. He pointed out that when you make a disk image of a computer’s hard disk and try to install that image on another computer, it just doesn’t work.

Of course, analogies between minds and computers are potentially problematic, but probably no less problematic than the thought experiments they are meant to illustrate.